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An Unrealistic Account of Moral Reasons1
Nierealistyczne ujęcie racji moralnych
Summary
In this paper I will analyze John McDowell’s broad account of prac‑
tical rationality and moral reasons, which he displays mainly in 
his articles “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” 
(1978) and “Might There Be External Reasons?” (1995). My main 
aim is to argue that from a philosophical perspective, no less than 
from an empirical one, McDowell’s account of practical rationality 
is not a realistic one. From a philosophical point of view, I will argue 
that his intellectualist account is not convincing; and if we consider 
his virtue‑ethical ideal of practical rationality in light of the model of 
human cognition, we also realize that moral behavior is not immune 
to cognitive biases and does not always flow from robust traits of 
character like virtues. At the same time, this puts at stake his strong 
thesis of moral autonomy – the idea that with the ‘onset of reason’ 
moral beings are no longer determined by ‘first nature’ features.
Keywords: John McDowell, practical rationality, moral reasons, vir‑
tue ethics, second nature
Streszczenie
W niniejszym artykule analizuję szerokie ujęcie praktycznej racjo‑
nalności i racji moralnych Johna McDowella, które przedstawia 
głównie w swoich artykułach „Are Moral Requirements Hypotheti‑
cal Imperatives?” (1978) i „Might There Be External Reasons?” 
(1995). Moim głównym celem jest pokazanie, że z perspektywy fi‑
1 This paper is a substantially extended and improved version of my 
previous paper “John McDowell on Practical Rationality – Is He (Really) 
Talking about Us?” (2018).
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lozoficznej, nie mniej niż empirycznej, jego ujęcie praktycznej ra‑
cjonalności nie jest realistyczne. Argumentuję, że z filozoficznego 
punktu widzenia jego intelektualistyczne ujęcie nie jest przekonują‑
ce; a jeśli jego ideał praktycznej racjonalności oparty na etyce cnoty 
rozważymy w świetle modelu ludzkiego poznania, zdamy sobie rów‑
nież sprawę, że zachowanie moralne nie jest odporne na kognitywne 
uprzedzenia i nie zawsze wypływa z wyrazistych cech charakteru 
takich jak cnoty. Tym samym podważa to jego mocną tezę autonomii 
moralnej – mianowicie ideę, że z „nadejściem rozumu” istoty moral‑
ne nie są już zdeterminowane przez cechy „pierwszej natury”.
Słowa kluczowe: John McDowell, praktyczna racjonalność, racje 
moralne, etyka cnót, druga natura
John McDowell’s general aim is to find a way of reconciling 
the supposedly impervious realms of reason and nature, by 
enlarging and enriching the natural domain (thus criticizing 
the scientific, narrow conception of nature, which identifies 
it with the law‑governed domain). The difficulties of locating 
normative thought within the realm of law are dismissed if 
one adopts a more sophisticated and expanded view of what is 
to be considered as natural. His goal is not so much to bridge 
the gulf between nature and reason, as to show, through a re‑
description of the notion of nature, that there is no gulf to 
be bridged. In general, I find this endeavor quite compelling 
and well‑guided. Nevertheless, there are some blind spots in 
McDowell’s well sustained project, regarding mostly his con‑
ception of practical rationality and his notion of rational au‑
tonomy. I shall point out and describe such blind spots, to the 
best of my awareness, and explain why I think them worth 
noting. This I will do from two different angles: first, from 
a conceptual point of view, by tracing some disturbing impli‑
cations of his account, and then from an empirical point of 
view, by discussing psychological and cognitive elements that 
should be taken into account.
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1. Moral reasons as external reasons
In what follows I shall try to give an account of John McDow‑
ell’s conception of practical rationality, and the subsidiary 
concept of second nature, using for the most part his collec‑
tion of articles Mind, Value and Reality (1998), as well as his 
Mind and World (1994). My overall aim is to argue that Mc‑
Dowell’s conception of human practical rationality has both 
conceptual and practical implications that are, at best, very 
unlikely, and, at worst, highly problematic and counter‑intu‑
itive. I will argue that, on the one hand, McDowell’s account 
leaves important questions unanswered and can’t help us to 
cope with certain issues of practical rationality, such as akra‑
sia; and, on the other hand, I will try to show that his concep‑
tion of practical rationality is not in line with what we know 
about the way we think and act. Not being representative/
typical of creatures like us, i.e., real agents, it is not, I will 
argue, a realistic conception, and this also makes it less in‑
teresting.
Some of his most important papers on practical rationality 
and, more specifically, on moral reasons, were written as re‑
sponses to other important philosophers, such as Bernard Wil‑
liams, Philippa Foot, J. L. Mackie or Simon Blackburn. I will 
give particular attention to those papers in which McDowell 
argues against Philippa Foot and Bernard Williams: “Two 
Sorts of Naturalism” (1995), “Are Moral Requirements Hypo‑
thetical Imperatives?” (1978) and “Might There Be External 
Reasons?” (1995) (all of them collected in his Mind, Value, and 
Reality). In “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Impera‑
tives?” and “Might There Be External Reasons?”, McDowell 
tries to answer the following question: What does it mean to 
say that someone has a reason to act in a specified way? Wil‑
liams (1979) famously argued that there are only internal rea‑
sons, meaning that one only has reason to do whatever prac‑
tical reasoning, starting from one’s existing motivations, may 
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reveal that one has reason to do.2 It is not that one has only 
reason to do what in a way satisfies some element in one’s sub‑
jective motivational set, but that those elements necessarily 
govern the deliberative reasoning leading up to the conclusion 
that one has reason to do something. Deliberative reasoning, 
according to Williams, should not be reduced to instrumental 
reasoning; it can assume different forms and, most important‑
ly, it can correct our desires.3
McDowell, on the other hand, defends the notion that there 
are external reasons – that there are reasons to act which are 
unconnected with our existing motivations. How do people ac‑
quire such reasons? How does a subject start believing that 
there is a reason to act in a certain way, if there is no connec‑
tion whatsoever with their motivational set? In order to con‑
stitute an external reason, that reason must have been there 
all along, so that in coming to see it, the agent must arrive at 
a proper consideration of the matter. How come we manage 
to get things right? Williams claims that if there were exter‑
2 It is important to notice that according to Williams’ interpretation 
it is not required that the agent is actually motivated to do what he has 
reason to do. The belief and the motivation are not necessarily connected, 
since agents can be akratic.
3 In fact, Williams presents no restricted account of practical or de‑
liberative reasoning – practical reasoning is more than the mere discov‑
ery that some course of action is the means to an end; it is “a heuristic 
process, and an imaginative one” (Williams 1979, p. 110) .“A clear ex‑
ample of practical reasoning is that leading to the conclusion that one 
has reason to  because ‑ing would be the most convenient, economical, 
pleasant etc. way of satisfying some element in S [the agent’s subjective 
motivational set], and this of course is controlled by other elements in 
S (…). But there are much wider possibilities for deliberation, such as: 
thinking how the satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, e.g. 
by time‑ordering; where there is some irresoluble conflict among the 
elements of S, considering which one attaches most weight to (…); or, 
again, finding constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make 
for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants entertainment” 
(idem, p. 110). “Imagination can create new possibilities and new de‑
sires” (idem, p. 105).
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nal reasons, there would be a procedure of correct deliberation 
that gives rise to a motivation, but that is not controlled by 
nor connected to the agent’s existing motivations. McDowell 
searches for a different explanation.
Let’s focus on a typical domain of practical rationality – 
the ethical domain. According to Williams, ethical reasons are 
internal reasons; according to McDowell they are external rea‑
sons. This means there are ethical reasons for us to do some‑
thing even if we are not able to see them and there is no prac‑
tical reasoning or deliberative path that can take us there – as 
McDowell puts it, “ethics involves requirements of reason that 
are there whether we know it or not, and our eyes are opened 
to them by the acquisition of ‘practical wisdom’ ” (McDowell 
1994, p. 79). The questions are: How can we get things right, 
as a virtuous person would?4 How do we come to believe there 
is a reason for acting in a specified way and how can we acquire 
a new motivation by getting things right?
McDowell is not purely Kantian – he does not say that 
agents are able to get things right because they are able to 
deliberate correctly, i.e., through a pure rational procedure. 
He clearly states that “the transition to being so motivated is 
a transition to deliberating correctly, not one effected by de‑
liberating correctly” (McDowell 1998, p. 107). As Pettit and 
Smith put it, McDowell is arguing that “agents have reasons 
that they don’t have the capacity to recognize and respond 
to, and that, in order to develop the capacity to recognize and 
respond to their reasons, they would have to undergo a con‑
version” (Pettit and Smith 2006, p. 161). No pure rational 
procedure would make us consider the matter aright – for 
instance, seeing that we should give back the wallet some 
4 McDowell follows Aristotle and his virtue ethics – he thinks the 
most important thing in ethics is to be a good person (a well-educated 
one). The virtuous person is the measure of the right action, and not the 
other way around.
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passer‑by has dropped. But that does not mean there is no 
reason to do that, and I would be able to see it if I were the 
right kind of person. If I had a proper ethical upbringing, 
I would have my eyes opened to some reasons I otherwise 
would not have been able to see. As with someone who did 
not have the benefit of an artistic education and hence can‑
not properly enjoy the experience of a work of art, someone 
who has not been properly brought up cannot see the reason 
why she should give back the wallet. But that reason exists 
(it is an external reason) – and “it might take something like 
a conversion to bring the reasons within the person’s notice”. 
(McDowell 1998, p. 107) McDowell brings back to life the Ar‑
istotelian conception of moral upbringing or moral education 
(or the more contemporary notion of Bildung). According to 
this conception, it is through initiation in a certain moral 
and social atmosphere that we get to acquire the intellectual 
and emotional maturation that allows us to manipulate con‑
cepts and to see reasons, namely moral reasons, to which we 
would otherwise be blind. The process by which the ethical 
character of an individual is formed, until virtue becomes 
a habit, in the words of Aristotle, receives the designation of 
second nature. McDowell interprets this Aristotelian point of 
view in the following manner:
Aristotle’s thought is that there is a right answer, and 
wrong answers, to the question what doing well consists in. 
And his usual remark about rightness on this kind of question 
is that the right view is the view of the person of excellence, 
or the person of practical wisdom. (McDowell 2009, p. 23–24) 
Thus, the point of view of the virtuous person is a special 
point of view: she has particular parochial capacities that make 
her able to discover moral reasons and moral value. If her prac‑
tical intellect has been properly formed, she will know on each 
occasion what the right thing to do is, because she will have 
her eyes open to the right reasons.
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1.1. The limits of a ‘naturalized Platonism’
This leads us to McDowell’s most controversial theses. One of 
the problems of this view is that it is hard to tell what the cri‑
teria for defining what counts as a ‘right reason’ are. It is not 
simply a matter of behaving in conformity with rules of con‑
duct. He clearly states that in moral upbringing, one learns “to 
see situations in a special light, as constituting reasons for act‑
ing; this perceptual capacity, once acquired, can be exercised 
in complex novel circumstances” (McDowell 1998, p. 85). But 
what could the criteria for correction be? How can anyone tell 
if one is seeing situations ‘in a special light’? There is no such 
external criterion, because the fact that something is morally 
valuable – thus presenting us with reasons for acting – will de‑
pend solely on how human beings with the appropriate sensi‑
tivity and moral training see the situation in question.5 Never‑
theless, reasons are to be understood as being ‘there anyway’, 
even if I, for instance – not having being subjected to a correct 
moral upbringing – cannot recognize them. That’s why they 
are considered to be external reasons. This is not ‘rampant 
Platonism’, and neither is it Kantian universalism, but it is 
a form of ‘naturalized Platonism’. Even if there is nothing un‑
natural in our responsiveness to reasons (being responsive to 
reasons belongs to our second nature), in the sense that rea‑
sons are ‘there anyway’, this is still Platonism. McDowell still 
has to explain how can there be external reasons, irrespective 
of our motivations and beliefs. As Charles Larmore puts it, the 
notion of second nature “does not tell us what reasons them‑
selves are, if reasons are supposed to be, as he himself avers, 
‘there anyway’, forming a possible object of knowledge”. And 
we cannot simply assume, as McDowell does, “that such ques‑
tions will evaporate, if only we take to heart the import of the 
5 This is why McDowell is considered to be not an advocate of moral 
realism, but an advocate of a sensibility theory instead.
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idea of second nature” (Larmore 2002, p. 196). On the con‑
trary, these questions still have to be tackled.
It is not feasible, I think, to just consider that, for McDow‑
ell, this process is simply a socially‑grounded process, that the 
validation of our ethical outlook can only be social or cultural 
(or that when we fail to recognize whatever reasons are ‘re‑
ally’ there, for how we ought to act, this is not an individual 
perceptual fault, but a social one). McDowell makes room for 
individual reflective criticism – our ethical thinking is subject 
to refinement and reflective scrutiny – and he is not in favor of 
a social grounding of our moral practices.6 The problem is just 
that, according to him, the only possible sort of validation is 
a ‘Neurathian’ one: there is no way to take a step back and re‑
flect on the standards that govern our ethical thinking; there is 
no way to take an external point of view, one can reflect only in 
medias res. As McDowell aptly puts it, “we have only our own 
lights to go on, in trying to ensure that the considerations that 
we are responsive to are really reasons for thinking one thing 
rather than another” (McDowell 2009, p 38). Actually, he goes 
even further, in the sense that he admits that looking for an ex‑
ternal validation is no more than a “fantasy” (McDowell 1994, 
p. 82). On the other hand, if it is through initiation in a cer‑
tain tradition and in a certain moral and social atmosphere 
that we get to acquire the appropriate conceptual capacities 
that enable us to discover moral reasons, it is hard to see what 
could be the role, in this process, of reflection and rational crit‑
icism. It seems that since the reflective scrutiny takes place 
6 He is very clear about this in Lecture V of his Mind and World, 
where he rejects any form of ‘communitarian’ or ‘social pragmatist’ at‑
tempts to ground the normative domain: “If there is nothing to the nor‑
mative structure within which meaning comes into view except, say, ac‑
ceptances and rejections of bits of behavior by the community at large, 
then how things are (...) cannot be independent of the community’s rat‑
ifying the judgement that things are thus and so.” And this would be, 
according to him, “intolerable” (McDowell 1994, p. 93).
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within the limits of the tradition in which one is embedded, 
the use of practical reason is limited. The fear is that, when 
facing disagreements or conflicts, the web of socialized value 
convictions and behaviors that constitutes the second nature is 
simply reproduced. The use of practical reason is limited in yet 
another way, which A. Honneth rightly acknowledges: if there 
is no deliberative way to make one aware of the moral reasons 
that are there, and it might take something like a conversion 
in order for those reasons to be unveiled, then
someone who has not been socialized in the appropriate ways 
will be moved through rational arguments into developing 
a moral sensibility just as little as someone closed to mod‑
ern music will be persuaded into enjoying twelve‑tone music. 
(Honneth 2002, p. 257)
Thus, moral reasons are there anyway, whether we are able to 
grasp them or not, and independently of our beliefs and moti‑
vations. But there is no deliberative path that can take us from 
our existing motivations and beliefs to those objective moral 
reasons or requirements. Thus, being able to grasp them or 
not seems to be just a matter of luck – only if we are lucky 
enough to had been provided with a ‘decent upbringing’, will 
we have acquired the necessary conceptual capacities allowing 
us to have our eyes opened to the right reasons. The ability 
of having our eyes opened to the right reasons is a conceptual 
ability – which results from the privilege of having had an ade‑
quate upbringing – but it is not constrained by rational princi‑
ples at all (since we cannot accuse someone who does not grasp 
the right reasons of being irrational).
This picture is problematic, and Bernard Williams had pre‑
viously pointed out what the problem is: How can one simply 
assert that there are some reasons out there, visible to only 
some of us, and independently of our motivations, cares and 
commitments, not connected to any process of deliberation 
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whatsoever? My general point is the following: even if it is true 
that the notion of Bildung “should eliminate the tendency to 
be spooked by the very idea of norms or demands of reason” 
(in the sense that these are no longer considered unnatural or 
supernatural), this is not enough to assume that “no genuine 
questions about norms” remain (McDowell 1994, p. 95).
1.2. The virtuous and the non-virtuous person: 
what distinguishes them?
In fact, McDowell’s view on moral reasons raises yet anoth‑
er problem, namely, that appropriately developed conceptual 
capacities – which allow some of us to perceive situations ‘in 
a special light’ – are all it takes to get things right. Getting 
things right – figuring out which ethical reasons there are – is 
a matter of ‘tuning up’ our moral perception, which is only 
possible if our conceptual powers were correctly developed 
through education. And if that is the case, then what distin‑
guishes a virtuous person (who can clearly see what should be 
done) from a non‑virtuous one is not that the former has dif‑
ferent motivations, preoccupations or cares – she simply sees 
things differently. As he states: “To a virtuous person, certain 
actions are presented as practically necessary (…) by his view 
of certain situations in which he finds himself.” And thus “a 
failure to see reason to act virtuously stems, not from the lack 
of a desire (…), but from the lack of a distinctive way of seeing 
situations” (McDowell 1998, p. 78, 87).
But if acting correctly is just a matter of seeing/perceiving 
correctly, any moral fault will be a cognitive fault, or, as Tim 
Thornton puts it, “moral actions are explained by a cognitive 
state alone; they are the result of a perception of the moral 
demands of the case” (Thornton 2004, p. 93). This means that 
if I am not able to do the right thing (for instance, to give back 
the wallet I just found), it is not because I lack motivation to do 
this, but only because I lack the knowledge that it is the thing 
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to be done. The difference between an honest and a dishonest 
person lies exclusively in their ways of perceiving their circum‑
stances. Thus, it would not be possible for two people to have 
exactly the same understanding of the circumstances and yet 
see different reasons to act.
Briefly, then, according to McDowell, it is a person’s under‑
standing of how things are that gives her a reason for action. 
And if I were the right kind of person, I would see the right 
reasons to act.7 Moral reasons, in particular, have no direct 
link with the agent’s existing motivations or interests; there 
is no need, in addition to her understanding of the relevant 
facts, for the agent to care about the situation, meaning that 
some desire would function as an independent and extra help 
in order to motivate her.8 For McDowell, to perceive the moral‑
ly correct action in the appropriate way just is to be motivated 
to do it. Here is how he explains it:
Adverting to his view of the facts may suffice, on its own, to 
show us the favorable light in which his action appeared to 
7 McDowell is a moral particularist: there is no rule or criterion to de‑
fine what the right action is; it will always depend on the particular con‑
text. A virtuous person is the one who knows how to act in each occasion, 
who is sensible enough to distinguish the particular features of each situ‑
ation. As I said before, the virtuous one is the measure of the right action.
8 As McDowell puts it: “A full specification of a reason must make 
clear how the reason was capable of motivating; it must contain enough 
to reveal the favorable light in which the agent saw his projected action. 
We tend to assume that this is effected, quite generally, by the inclusion 
of a desire. (…) However, it seems to be false that the motivating power of 
all reasons derives from their including desires” (McDowell 1998, p. 79). 
And McDowell is not alone in defending the view that beliefs have moti‑
vational powers on their own. This is how Thomas Nagel puts it: “That 
I have the appropriate desire simply follows from the fact that these con‑
siderations motivate me; if the likelihood that an act will promote my 
future happiness motivates me to perform it now, then it is appropriate to 
ascribe to me a desire for my own future happiness. But nothing follows 
about the role of the desire as a condition contributing to the motivational 
efficacy of those considerations” (Nagel 1979, p. 29–30).
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him. No doubt we credit him with an appropriate desire, per‑
haps for his own future happiness. But the commitment to as‑
cribe such a desire is simply consequential on our taking him 
to act as he does for the reason we cite; the desire does not 
function as an independent extra component in a full specifi‑
cation of his reason, hitherto omitted by an understandable 
ellipsis of the obvious, but strictly necessary in order to show 
how it is that the reason can motivate him. Properly under‑
stood, his belief does that on its own. (McDowell 1998, p. 79) 
In other words: “a desire ascribed in this purely consequential 
way is not independently intelligible” (McDowell 1998, p. 84), 
it is simply the motivational counterpart (or the motivational 
component) of his understanding of the relevant facts. 
The problem is, of course, a Humean one – is it possible 
for a purely cognitive state (a view of how things are) to en‑
tail some disposition to act, or to make the action attractive 
to its possessor? Hume would put it like this: does reason mo‑
tivate? McDowell would simply say that to assume that cog‑
nitive and conative/affective states have distinct existences is 
just a Humean dogma that we don’t have to accept. In fact, as 
Pettit and Smith put it, “what makes it possible for a virtuous 
agent to behave virtuously [according to McDowell’s view], is 
that she is capable of enjoying a distinctive kind of psycholog‑
ical state that is both belief‑like and desire‑like” (Pettit and 
Smith 2006, p. 163). Similarly, we don’t have to take for grant‑
ed that the world is, in itself, “motivationally inert” – “the idea 
of the world as motivationally inert is not an independent hard 
datum. It is simply the metaphysical counterpart of the thesis 
that states of will and cognitive states are distinct existences, 
which is exactly what is in question” (McDowell 1998, p. 83). 
My worries about this view, I must say, have less to do with the 
worldview it presupposes than with the picture of humanity 
this view leaves us with. Are we really like that?
According to this view, there is no possible situation in 
which someone has the relevant understanding of the situa‑
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tion (say, that the thing to do is to give back the wallet) and 
is not motivated to act accordingly. As McDowell puts it: “we 
should say that the relevant conceptions are not so much as 
possessed except by those whose wills are influenced appropri‑
ately” (McDowell 1998, p. 87). Thus, believing that giving back 
the wallet is the thing to do necessarily entails wanting to do it 
(if the agent A thinks there is a reason to  in a particular case 
Y, then she must be willing to  in Y).9
My doubts about this intellectualist account are the follow‑
ing: does that description really match the way people are, and 
act? Is it really the case that I don’t give back the wallet just 
because I don’t know what the correct thing to do is (I just 
have the illusion that I know)? Closely related with this is the 
description McDowell presents of the virtuous agent’s moral 
psychology: the virtuous person simply does not need to weigh 
reasons, because once she sees what the thing to do is, every 
other contrary reason that she might have simply vanishes:
the dictates of virtue, if properly appreciated, are not weighed 
with other reasons at all, not even on a scale that always tips 
on their side. If a situation in which virtue imposes a require‑
ment is genuinely conceived as such, according to this view, 
then considerations that, in the absence of the requirement, 
would have constituted reasons for acting otherwise are si‑
lenced altogether – not overridden – by the requirement. (Mc‑
Dowell 1998, p. 90)
9 This is usually referred as motivational internalism: “The names 
‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’ have been used to designate two views of 
the relation between ethics and motivation. Internalism is the view that 
the presence of a motivation for acting morally is guaranteed by the truth 
of ethical propositions themselves. On this view the motivation must be 
so tied to the truth, or meaning, of ethical statements that when in a par‑
ticular case someone is (or perhaps merely believes that he is) morally 
required to do something, it follows that he has a motivation for doing it. 
Externalism holds, on the other hand, that the necessary motivation is 
not supplied by ethical principles and judgments themselves, and that an 
additional psychological sanction is required to motivate our compliance.” 
(Nagel 1979, p. 7)
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It seems that McDowell has in mind some kind of ideal agent, 
not a real one.10 But it is a kind of ideal with no particular 
function attached, because there is no way to teach a non‑vir‑
tuous person to become virtuous, and hence no definite way to 
get closer to that ideal. And what about akrasia? According to 
this view it seems impossible that someone may act contrarily 
to her best judgment. If the akratic person knows she is not 
acting as virtue demands, then most likely she conceives the 
circumstances of her action as the virtuous person would con‑
ceive them. But then, if acting correctly is just a matter of per‑
ceiving the matter correctly, there is no room left to akrasia – if 
someone conceives the situation as the virtuous person does, 
then she would know what to do and any other considerations 
that might constitute reasons for acting otherwise would sim‑
ply be silenced. As McDowell admits, “one cannot share a vir‑
tuous person’s view of a situation in which it seems to him that 
virtue requires some action, but see no reason to act in that 
way” (McDowell 1998, p. 90).
The only solution available to McDowell is simply to posit 
that the incontinent and the continent person’s understanding 
of a situation does not match that of a virtuous person (his 
account of akrasia is discussed in the paper I cited above, “Are 
Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” and also in 
his “Virtue and Reason”, both in McDowell 1998). In McDow‑
ell’s own words: “The way out is to attenuate the degree to 
which the continent or incontinent person’s conception of a sit‑
uation matches that of a virtuous person” (McDowell 1998, p. 
92). But then, if his proposal is correct, we will have different 
psychological models attached to different moral characters: 
the virtuous person is not vulnerable to akrasia and that is 
because she “is capable of enjoying a distinctive kind of psy‑
10 And he rightly acknowledges that: “This view of virtue obviously 
involves a high degree of idealization; the best we usually encounter is to 
some degree tainted with continence.” (McDowell 1998, p. 92)
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chological state that is both belief‑like and desire‑like” (Pettit 
and Smith 2006, p. 163). For the virtuous person, possible op‑
posing reasons to act are simply silenced. For the less than vir‑
tuous, opposing reasons are not silenced – “Their inclinations 
are aroused, as the virtuous person’s are not, by their aware‑
ness of competing attractions: a lively desire clouds or blurs 
the focus of their attention on ‘the noble’” (McDowell 1998, p. 
92), – and that’s why such a person acts in an akratic way. But 
this means that her motivational structure is not the same as 
that of the virtuous person’s – vulnerable as she is to opposing 
desires; it is a Humean psychological structure (composed of 
a belief and desire) rather than a purely cognitive one. While 
the less than virtuous should be described as having either be‑
liefs or desires, the virtuous one should be described as having 
a “besire” (Altham 1986), a hybrid kind of psychological state, 
a belief that is simultaneously a desire. This result – different 
moral characters or standpoints implying different psychologi‑
cal and motivational structures – seems quite disturbing.
In a nutshell, what I am arguing is that, while not being 
a pure Kantian, still, McDowell inflates the agent’s rationality 
by stating that if the agent thinks she has a (moral) reason to 
do X, then she wants/is motivated to do X. I think it is worth 
pointing out that we are not like that: sometimes, we really 
think that we must do X, or that we have reason to do it, but 
still we want to do something else. And the answer to this chal‑
lenge cannot simply be: we are not like that because we are not 
ideal agents. That much we know; and an ethical theory – if we 
want it to be useful – must have something to say to us, real 
agents.
If Hume has a minimalist conception of practical rationali‑
ty (it has only an instrumental role, of finding the right means 
to attain a given end), McDowell can be accused of the opposite 
excess, namely of assuming the intellectualist position that 
practical knowledge necessarily entails motivation to act; that 
the agent must want to do what she has a reason to do. Neither 
Susana Cadilha20
of these seems to give an accurate account of how rationality 
and desire combine in order to originate action. If it is true, on 
the one hand, that we can rationally deliberate about ends and 
not only about means (that desires are subject to rational crit‑
icism), it is also true, on the other, that there is no guarantee 
that the agent’s motivation will always align with the agent’s 
reasons, or that the agent necessarily wants to do what she 
thinks is the best to do.
2. Are human beings essentially rational?
So far I’ve been arguing that McDowell gives an inflated ac‑
count of practical rationality and thus he is not actually speak‑
ing about real agents, people like us.
Connected with that thesis, there is another way in which 
I think McDowell shows his alignment to that classical philo‑
sophical conception of humanity, according to which human 
beings are the exemplars of rationality and autonomy. In fact, 
McDowell thinks that the human beings are creatures that 
stand apart from animals by virtue of their powers of self‑con‑
trol, reasoning, and reflection – that there is a clear line that 
separates the human from the animal way of living. In his 
Mind and World, he clearly states that:
we do not fall into rampant Platonism if we say the shape 
of our lives is no longer determined by immediate biological 
forces. To acquire the spontaneity of the understanding is to 
become able, as Gadamer puts it, to ‘rise above the pressure 
of what impinges on us from the world’ (Truth and Meth‑
od, p. 444) – that succession of problems and opportunities 
constituted as such by biological imperatives – into a ‘free, 
distanced orientation’. (McDowell 1994, p. 115–116) 
This is also because McDowell draws a very sharp distinction 
between conceptual and non‑conceptual cognitive agents and 
thinkers. The problem is that this division is too abrupt, and 
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without intermediaries. There is a world of difference between 
mature human beings, inserted in the space of reasons, on the 
one hand, and infants or animals, on the other. Strictly speak‑
ing, infants and animals cannot have experiences (since any 
experience is conceptually structured), and thus the way in‑
fants or animals, for instance, feel pain, is not the same way in 
which mature human beings feel pain. According to McDowell, 
even our perceptual experience is permeated with rationality. 
In his own words:
our perceptual relation to the world is conceptual all the way 
out to the world’s impacts on our receptive capacities. The 
idea of the conceptual that I mean to be invoking is to be 
understood in close connection with the idea of rationality, in 
the sense that is in play in the traditional separation of ma‑
ture human beings, as rational animals, from the rest of the 
animal kingdom. (McDowell 2009, p. 308)
To account for this distance between rational and non‑ratio‑
nal creatures, he explores the metaphor of the rational wolf. 
Suppose we can pretend that wolves could acquire logos – how 
would a rational wolf act? What could the difference be (be‑
tween a non‑rational and a rational wolf)? According to Mc‑
Dowell, the differences would be substantial and fundamen‑
tal. “A rational wolf would be able to let his mind roam over 
possibilities of behavior other than what comes naturally to 
wolves”, such that he is no longer determined by his natural 
tendencies, but “has genuinely alternative possibilities of ac‑
tion, over which his thought can play” (McDowell 1998, p. 170). 
A non‑rational animal is not able to move away from its nat‑
ural impulse, but our rational wolf, “having acquired reason, 
can contemplate alternatives; he can step back from the natu‑
ral impulse and direct critical scrutiny at it” (McDowell 1998, 
p. 171). There is a world of difference between the deliberating 
wolf wondering what to do, and the non‑rational animal which 
is not able to transcend its first nature traits; the way its needs 
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and motivational impulses impinge on its behavior has no par‑
allel with the way our rational wolf is able to ‘transcend his 
wolfish nature’. In McDowell’s own words, “The concept of na‑
ture figures here, without incoherence, in two quite different 
ways: as ‘mere’ nature, and as something whose realization 
involves transcending that” (McDowell 1998, p. 173).
Thus, the main difference between human beings and (oth‑
er) animals is that we “do not just inhabit an environment, 
but are open to a world” (McDowell 2009, p. 315). This means 
all our experiences are permeated with rationality (and this 
is what Dreyfus calls the ‘Myth of the Mental’). In fact, this 
abrupt leap, between creatures that have a world and crea‑
tures that merely cope with their habitat or environment, is 
correctly identified, for instance, by Crispin Wright, Jay Bern‑
stein, and Hubert Dreyfus, the problem being that, according 
to them, the formation of the second nature is an all‑or‑noth‑
ing process, a kind of “magical process where we leap from 
meaningless chaos into the demands of reason without inter‑
mediaries” (Bernstein 2002, p. 222). 
In what follows, I will try to tackle this issue, showing the 
limitations of McDowell’s proposal, through two different an‑
gles. First, from a conceptual point of view, I will argue that 
McDowell does not accomplish his ambition of overcoming du‑
alism, he simply replaces it. He is not able to explain how the 
traces of our animality are to be present in the space of reasons 
(2.1). Second, from an empirical point of view, I will argue that 
the strong kind of rational autonomy that McDowell posits is 
both unrealistic and disconnected from what we know about 
how moral thinking works (2.2).
2.1. Animality and the onset of reason
McDowell strives to overcome the image of the human being 
as a bifurcated creature through the concept of second nature. 
Within the framework of second nature, reason or rationality 
An Unrealistic Account of Moral Reasons 23
is no longer at odds with what is natural (as long as we accept 
that nature is not reduced to the realm of law). The touchstone 
is this idea that exercises of spontaneity are simply a way of 
realizing and fulfilling our human nature. But the problem is 
that even if we can agree that exercises of spontaneity are a way 
to actualize our nature as human beings, it is still true that we 
are animals who also possess reason, and he still has to explain 
how these aspects fit one another. My worries are double: on 
one side, I think he fails to overcome all dualisms, as he aspires 
to – he maintains a dualism within the broader redescription 
of the domain of nature; on the other side, because he thinks 
he need not explain how the traces of our animality inhabit the 
space of reason, he defends the unlikely theses that there is no 
continuum between animal dispositions and rational action, 
and that when we enter the space of reasons, all that belongs 
to our first nature is simply silenced or suspended.
Many of his critics think that McDowell is unable to over‑
come all dualisms. Bernstein considers that:
despite himself, in construing the space of reasons as sui ge-
neris and that of essentially free beings, McDowell operates 
with a dualistic scheme of a first nature subject to law (or that 
is appropriately “hard‑wired”) and a second nature subject to 
the demands of (free) reason. (Bernstein 2002, p. 223–4) 
Gaskin finds the exact same problem:
In permitting or recognizing the materials of second nature to 
be ‘natural’, we ‘overcome’ the dualism of reason and nature, 
but the victory is a pyrrhic one, for we are left with a distinc‑
tion which is the same, in substance, as the one we started 
with, only now relabeled a distinction between reason and law. 
(...) If the original problem was how to fit reason into a world 
understood naturalistically (giving this word its traditional 
gloss, by adverting to facts of exclusively first nature), the 
redescribed problem is how to fit reason into a world under‑
stood nomologically (...) Merely assuring us that the rational, 
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as well as the nomological, ought to be regarded as—or is any‑
way—natural goes no distance at all towards addressing the 
underlying problem. (Gaskin 2006, p. 38) 
And McDowell himself acknowledges that he should give some 
account of “how the law‑governed and the free are related” 
(McDowell 2000, p. 102).
Giving us no clue as to ‘how the law‑governed and the free 
are related’, he simply assures us that there is no continuum 
between mere cognitive agents that cope with their environ‑
ment and thinkers, or rational agents that are able, for in‑
stance, to think in moral terms. As a matter of fact, he asserts 
that:
Moral education does not merely rechannel one’s natural mo‑
tivational impulses, with the acquisition of reason making 
no difference except that one becomes self‑consciously aware 
of the operation of those impulses. In imparting logos, mor‑
al education enables one to step back from any motivational 
impulse one finds oneself subject to, and question its rational 
credentials. Thus it effects a kind of distancing of the agent 
from the practical tendencies that are part of what we might 
call his first nature. (McDowell 1998, p. 188) 
But if he is not able to explain how is it that the exercises of 
spontaneity are related with the more or less plastic routines 
that characterize higher mammals’ behavior – and thus our 
own behavior too –, how can he claim that those exercises of 
spontaneity constitute our way of actualize ourselves as ani‑
mals? As Bernstein rightly puts it:
to agree that human forms of nurturing the young, for ex‑
ample, are not reducible to the behavioral patterns through 
which our nearest animal relations nurture their young is 
not, for all that, to accede to the claim that our nurturing is 
sui generis, wholly formed by the demands of reason. (Bern‑
stein 2002, p. 223) 
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The problem is that McDowell simply asserts that rationality 
definitely separates us from our own animality once and for 
all, or as Dreyfus set forth, McDowell simply presumes that 
“all intelligibility is pervaded by rational capacities” (Dreyfus 
2013, p. 15), instead of going with a more modest account of 
how rationality pervades our experiences. It seems quite dis‑
putable, given what we know about ourselves, to assume that 
we are essentially rational animals, rather than our rationality 
being just one aspect of human experience. In the later debate 
between McDowell and Dreyfus (McDowell 2008, 2009, 2013), 
the former takes substantial steps to mitigate the rationalistic 
and intellectualistic features of his view of human life in the 
space of reasons, but I think he still fell short of accomplishing 
his aim.
Continuing to think about the ethical domain, it’s easy to 
see how McDowell is prone to recognizing the autonomy of any 
normative domain such as the ethical one. There is an is‑ought 
gap and no communication is allowed (even if this is‑ought 
gap is located within what McDowell claims to be a broader 
naturalism). It is true that, given his broader conception of 
naturalism, the space of reasons is no longer pictured as au‑
tonomous in the sense of being constituted independently of 
anything specifically human (as we have seen, responsiveness 
to reasons is not supernatural) – but it is still pictured as au‑
tonomous in the sense of not being determined or influenced 
by causal factors. This means that moral matters are purely 
conceptual and rational matters – thinking what we should do 
is a rational ability that only humans have, and any descrip‑
tive or psychological aspect of man is derived from that ability. 
I mean: the instinctive tendencies we share with other animals 
do not determine that conceptual and rational ability; and that 
rational ability cannot be explained in a way that is not itself 
rational. McDowell is convinced that reason produces such an 
alteration in one’s make‑up that ‘the authority of nature’ is 
put into question. In fact, if “nature controls the behavior of 
Susana Cadilha26
a non‑rational animal (…), reason compels nature to abdicate 
that authority” (McDowell 1998, p. 188). The ‘onset of reason’ 
“effects a kind of distancing of the agent from the practical 
tendencies that are part of what we might call his first nature” 
in such a way that “[its] dictates acquired an authority that 
replaces the authority abdicated by first nature” (McDowell 
1998, p. 188).
My doubts are the following: is it really the case that when 
it comes to moral matters our ‘first nature’ traits are simply 
overridden? That we get rid of all of our natural determina‑
tions? That with the ‘onset of reason’, as McDowell puts it, the 
practical tendencies that are part of our first nature simply 
vanish? My opinion is that it is not very plausible to think, 
with McDowell, that there is an abrupt chasm between biolog‑
ically determined creatures, on the one hand, and creatures 
moved only by reasons, on the other. Our rational and concep‑
tual abilities do not simply override our animal nature.
More specifically: I believe our ‘second nature’ – the ex‑
ercise of conceptual capacities acquired through training and 
education – allows us to grasp a layer of reality that it is not 
available to the rest of the animal kingdom, and I believe Mc‑
Dowell is correct when he claims that these capacities cannot 
be reduced or explained in terms of biological features. More‑
over, if we adopt a broader naturalism, as we should, we need 
not aim at such biological reductionism. The problem, howev‑
er, is that, if even in the context of a broader naturalism, he 
still holds on to a kind of discontinuity and autonomy, as if hu‑
man beings are able to rise completely above their most basic 
determinacies, which seems to me to be out of place. 
It seems clear to me that only rational beings are capable 
of elaborate moral systems and sophisticated forms of moral 
thinking. Sophisticated forms of moral thinking imply con‑
ceptualization and abstract reasoning. After all, besides being 
capable of feelings of outrage in the face of asymmetry and 
unfairness (this is an inequity aversion that we share with 
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non‑human primates – cf. De Waal & Berger 2000 and Bros‑
nan & De Waal 2003), we are also able to design sophisticated 
constructs such as theories of justice. The ability to morally 
evaluate, which characterizes us at this point in our develop‑
ment, involves the ability to pose what philosophers usually re‑
fer to as the ‘normative question’: to think about what should 
be the case, to question the assumptions and the consequences 
of action. Now, this is not an automatic behavior or an instinct. 
This fully developed ability to think in moral terms is what 
characterizes us as moral beings. What seems questionable is 
to conceive of there being no continuity whatsoever between 
one thing and another and to maintain that our ability to think 
in moral terms is of a fundamentally different nature, which 
keeps us irremediably apart from the ‘mere’ dispositions and 
feelings of non‑linguistic animals. What seems questionable is 
the idea that being a moral agent has to do with an ability for 
conceptual thinking, but not also with the ability to repudiate 
certain asymmetries in certain situations. It seems plausible 
to say that there is a link between this fully developed capacity 
we exhibit today and the intuitions and dispositions probably 
exhibited by our ancestors. My point is this: because we are 
linguistic beings, capable of conceptual and abstract thinking, 
we have arrived at a level of sophistication in terms of moral 
thinking that allows us to think in terms of reasons, and to 
develop theories that allow the justification of moral positions 
before the members of the community who also have the abili‑
ty to discuss them. But the fact that we have reached this level 
does not mean that the ability to assign value to items in the 
world, and perhaps the content of some evaluative positions, 
may not have been influenced and shaped by factors other 
than rational reflection. It seems to me legitimate to think that 
there was evaluation and value assignment before there was 
a rational capacity for justification. This basic capacity to expe‑
rience items in the world as things requiring certain reactions 
or meriting certain reactions precedes a linguistically mediat‑
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ed reflective ability to pose the normative question. Thus, be‑
cause we are sophisticated creatures, we can take a step back 
with respect to these primitive evaluative dispositions or intu‑
itions and not follow them compulsorily; but the fact that we 
are reflective creatures who can take that step back does not 
entail that such dispositions cannot still influence our moral 
judgements.
2.2. How autonomous can moral thinking be?
This question can also be tackled from an empirical stand‑
point. I think such a standpoint should be taken into account, 
since it provides us with another way of seeing how difficult it 
is to believe McDowell’s thesis that our rational and concep‑
tual capacities are completely untainted by other aspects of 
our psychology. If we take a careful look, for instance, at some 
experiments on moral psychology (see, for instance, Haidt et 
al. 1993; Haidt & Bjorklund 2008; Greene et al. 2001), we may 
be able to see that it’s not the case that our moral judgments 
always arise out of data manipulation and further rational de‑
liberation. Rather, what we usually define as a moral judgment 
may after all have its basis in a “gut reaction” and may not 
be an expression of propositional knowledge. When faced with 
certain types of morally innocuous transgressions (like using 
a national flag to wipe the floor, or drinking a glass of water 
after having spat in it), people show the same kind of reactions 
that moral transgressions elicit (they are thought of as being 
universally wrong, of a non‑contingent and mandatory nature, 
their wrongness independent from authority), even though 
they cannot find a reason to justify this. This appears to bring 
moral judgments close to a certain kind of affective response in 
which reflection over propositional contents plays little or no 
role at all (see also Nichols and Folds‑Bennett 2003).
These experiments are in line with numerous experimen‑
tal studies that represent the core of cognitive psychology, and 
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that rest on the hypothesis that most of our judgments result 
from the triggering of fast and frugal heuristics, and not from 
deliberative processes. It is not absurd to think that the same 
happens with moral judgments: they result from heuristics 
and many of them are automatic.11 (This doesn’t mean mor‑
al reasoning has no place, but it is possible to argue that its 
main function is that of a post‑hoc rationalization – it is useful 
to justify previous intuitions or whenever a conflict between 
moral intuitions arises). In fact, in many different areas of re‑
search it has been found that people make evaluations (as to 
whether an event/object is good or bad, for instance) imme‑
diately, unintentionally and without awareness that they are 
doing it, so it may be the case that “what we think we are 
doing while consciously deliberating in actuality has no effect 
on the outcome of the judgment, as it has already been made 
through relatively immediate, automatic means” (Bargh and 
Chartrand 1999, p. 475). It is not absurd to think that the in‑
fluences of heuristics and biases uncovered in recent cognitive 
psychology are widespread in everyday ethical reflection.
So, it might be the case that human beings are not para‑
gons of rationality and autonomy. But if we stick to McDow‑
ell’s theory of practical rationality, it is clear that the capacity 
that determines, in a given situation, what matters about that 
situation and that enables us to evaluate it, is a conceptual 
conscious ability that only rational animals possess (it is the 
result of being initiated into a ‘conceptual space’, as McDowell 
puts it). And it is also clear that the actions through which 
we manifest our moral character must be chosen; even if Mc‑
Dowell grants, following Aristotle, that virtuous action is the 
result of habit, we must not understand that as happening out 
of instinct or inertia – on the contrary, virtue requires that 
11 One of the simplest heuristics studied in this field is that which 
makes us immediately agree with and positively value what is said by 
people we like.
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“specially human capacity for discursive thought”. (McDow‑
ell 1998, p. 39) But if we consider the virtue‑ethical ideals of 
practical rationality in light of the model of human cognition 
now emerging, we realize that moral behavior is not immune 
to cognitive biases and that it does not always flow from re‑
flectively endorsed moral norms or robust traits of character 
like virtues. Rather, we see that minor situational influences 
(such as ambient noise, or the fact that someone is in a hurry) 
determine moral behavior (see, for instance, Isen and Levin 
1972; Darley and Batson 1973; Mathews and Cannon 1975). 
In fact, various experiments in social psychology have revealed 
that subjects were much more likely to help someone in need if 
they had just found a dime, or are not in a hurry, or if the am‑
bient noise was at normal levels. Circumstantial and morally 
irrelevant factors influence moral behavior in a decisive way, 
and can also influence the way we perceive the situation as an 
occasion for ethical decision. And it is extremely relevant that 
those cognitive biases or response tendencies are beyond the 
reach of individual practical rationality.
Thus it seems as though not only McDowell’s conception of 
moral abilities but also his idea that it suffices to believe that 
X is the thing to do in order to be motivated to do it are not in 
line with what we know about the way we are and think. It is 
possible to simply argue that real agents are defective practical 
reasoners, but in that case we need to admit that there is a dis‑
tance between the picture of human cognition that applies to 
virtuous people and the model of human cognition now emerg‑
ing in the cognitive sciences that applies to everyone else. And 
how useful and illuminating can that be?
My point in this paper was just to argue that from a philo‑
sophical perspective, no less than from an empirical one, Mc‑
Dowell’s account of practical rationality is not realistic, since 
it seems to ignore features that are determinative of us as hu‑
man agents.
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